Last week an experienced thru-hiker, 37-year old Christopher Roma, died tragically of exposure in the White Mountains. My condolences are with his parents, family, and friends.
My father and several alumni shared this news with me. I had never met Christopher, but in at least a few respects we were kindred souls.
I know only public details about the accident, from news reports. And based on that information I wouldn’t dare question his preparedness or his decision-making. For all I know, he could have done this exact trip multiple times before at this exact time of year; or he just got unlucky, because his parka zipper or snowshoe strap broke.
Many people will question his actions, however, since the conditions were objectively bad. According to ABC, he was facing “single-digit temperatures, harsh winds and waist-deep snow.” A helicopter tried three times to land near him, and couldn’t because of poor visibility. And many rescuers had to retreat because they were getting frostbite themselves.
I will ponder though: Did he not turn back because he had never turned back before?
I ask this because it’s a lesson that most thru-hikers don’t ever learn — or, at least I didn’t. It’s conceivable that Christopher hiked the Pacific Crest, Continental Divide, and Appalachian Trails, plus probably many other lesser known trails and summits, without ever having to turn around. Certainly the conditions would have been challenging at times, but never so bad that he couldn’t push through them or get out of them. That’s the reality of these trails in three-season conditions.
In other outdoor sports, turning back is more embedded in the culture and a more widely discussed expectation. For example, backcountry skiers turn back if they think the avalanche conditions are too risky. Mountaineers turn back if the conditions deteriorate, if they don’t reach the summit before a designated time, or if they’re too exhausted. And rock/ice climbers turn back if there is too much rockfall or weak ice.
In contrast, thru-hikers can come to expect that they can always move forward because they always have. Until one day they can’t. And if you’ve never turned back before, why suddenly would you realize that it’s even an option. Turning back is like a muscle — if you don’t ever use it, you may not know it’s there.
I feel very fortunate that I didn’t learn this lesson the hardest way, with my own life. In hindsight, it could have gone the other way on a few occasions, like when I thought I could hike my standard 30+ miles on the CDT through Colorado’s San Juans despite day-long 35-degrees-and-raining conditions, or when I forded the South Fork of the San Joaquin during peak runoff without even looking for a better spot than the trail crossing, or when I hiked and skied through avalanche terrain in Colorado without really understanding avalanche basics.
It wasn’t until the Alaska-Yukon Expedition that I made the realization, perhaps because I was no longer a naive twenty-something or because that landscape is more properly intimidating, with storms, rivers, mountains, and wilderness that are unrivaled in size and power by the lower 48. It took a few close calls for me to be okay with covering ground when the conditions permitted, and holing up for hours or days when they didn’t. Finesse not force, became my new refrain.
Even if it may not have helped Christopher, I hope another thru-hiker will benefit from knowing that turning around is an option.
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Andrew: I think you seriously underplayed this lesson: “It took a few close calls for me to be okay with covering ground when the conditions permitted, and holing up for hours or days when they didn’t.” Roma wasn’t far from forest with some protection from the wind and wood to burn. Drop down into the woods, get a fire going, warm up, dry out and live to fight another day.
While this may sound helpful, whiteout conditions with 80mph winds and windchill around -40 are unlikely to be conditions to start a fire in.
While I don’t think a fire would have helped much, everything up there is spruce and you don’t have to drop too far to find birch either and if you can’t light those on fire, you probably shouldn’t stray far from modern civilization. If you’re in the wind/rime you’ll have trouble, but in those conditions a fire really isn’t gonna do much. Why do people think things are less flammable in the cold? You’ll have to warm the gas in a lighter and obviously snow/ice covered stuff has to dry but it’s not like superhero movies where sheer cold can conquer fire.
There seems to be a lot of conflicting info on what he was carrying and what his plan was – I had heard he didn’t have snow shoes and had planned to do the 30 mile loop in a day. If true, I’m absolutely convinced this was suicide. No one with that level of experience would think that was a reasonable goal (at least, not while breaking trail), not without gear to spend the night. (I don’t want to hear crap from people claiming this was a reasonable plan; I’ve spent most of my climbing career with professionals so I have a pretty damn good idea what’s possible and what’s not). I have thought about these things in dark times, and walking into the woods in winter purposely unprepared is a good way to guarantee you’ll die if a more overt act is too difficult; once you get far enough you can’t really change your mind, and he just happened to pick one of the most inaccessible places in the state (maximizing the time a rescue would take, if he did change his mind). Apparently there was a decently long call to family a good while before a rescue was initiated; I can’t imagine this was a discussion about whether he should turn back or if it was safe for him to continue in those conditions or if a rescue was needed. A “goodbye” call followed by pleas to change his mind does kinda fit the timeline though.
I don’t really expect anyone who knows the truth to admit it, but am I the only one who thinks this is a reasonable analysis? Every action makes sense under this theory, whereas otherwise pretty much none of it makes sense; we’re not talking about an experience guy who made a mistake out of hubris, we’re talking about an experienced guy who did quite a few things that don’t make sense.
Ignoring this theory, I also think it’s important in these analysis to differentiate between mistakes, accidents, bad luck, and terrible decisions. Forgetting a piece of gear or taking a wrong trail are mistakes. Tripping and breaking your ankle is an accident. Getting hit by a fallen rock is bad luck. Getting caught in a storm 5 days into a 2 week trip is bad luck. Getting caught in bad weather on a day hike is (almost always) NOT bad luck. Predicting exactly where and when convection will fire is tough, and it’s possible for storms to form so quickly (eg a cap eroding) that you could be stuck on a ridge, but synoptically we’re pretty good 24-48 hours out, maybe a few hours wiggle room on fronts moving through, but I would argue if your “plan” involves being off the mountain a few hours before conditions seriously deteriorate (cough cough Kate Matrosova) it’s not “bad luck” if the front comes through a few hours early. In Kate’s case, there were a whole series of poor decisions, although plenty of people have done backflips trying to absolve her, my favorite being those who blame the SPOT device for not providing accurate enough coordinates; I find this disgusting, especially as someone who did S&R for a while, and especially since this was one of the most dangerous rescue attempts; we’re talking windchills 90 below. SPOT shouldn’t be part of the discussion because there really shouldn’t have been a rescue attempt anyway! That’s the bigger discussion: how irresponsible was it for rescuers to go up there? However, none of her subsequent decisions are really relevant compared to the severity of the decision to go out on the cusp of such conditions. It’s like jumping into rapids from 100’ and saying “you better wear a life jacket so you don’t drown.” It’s the fall that’s gonna kill you!
PLEASE stop calling this “bad luck”! I’m so sick of this. This wasn’t some freak storm that no one saw coming. There ARE objective hazards in the mountains, and there ARE people who do EVERYTHING right and still die, and I think it’s wrong and dangerous to try to stuff everyone in that category as it misconstrues the nature of the risks. What the hell is wrong with people who think it’s ok not to prepare for worse weather than you expect? What, he was prepared for the conditions he thought he would encounter? What’s that got to do with the price of beans? Someone who hikes up Washington on a hot summer day with nothing but a t-shirt and shorts is also prepared for the conditions they think they’ll encounter, and if they’re back at the parking lot before dark they’ll probably be fine, but if they get hurt and need a rescue you better believe they’re getting a bill. What’s the difference between a flatlander preparing for 60 degrees when nighttime windchills can get close to freezing, and an experienced hiker preparing for negative 15 when nighttime wind chills could get to 40 below? Was one “luckier” than the other?
This talk about the decision to turn back is a red herring, or at least, when the decision came is; the discussion should stop the second he took a step on an unbroken trail without skis or snowshoes [with the intent of following his original plan]. After that, every step constituted an increasingly poor decision.
This also highlights what I’ll call “illusory experience” – it’s distressingly common for people with tons of hiking experience to die here, but much like with Kate, trail miles don’t equal experience. I think this is a testament to the danger of the whites: do you think these people were drunk or got hit in the head and were suddenly far more reckless than they’d ever been before? Or is it more likely they’ve always been doing kinda stupid things, they’ve just been able to get away with it elsewhere? I would argue: going on any hike without the ability to spend a night disqualifies someone from being called “experienced” no matter how many thousands of trail miles they have. It’s like a good friend of mine who’s an expert skier (like, warming up on Corbets), but he doesn’t know a god damn thing about avalanches and stability tests; he carries beacon/probe/shovel but I doubt he practices with any regularity. This gets back to luck: I don’t consider it bad luck if you trigger an avalanche on a “moderate” (2 out of 5) danger day without doing any stability assessments, just assuming you’ll be fine because of the rating. If you hiked up the line you’re gonna ski, doing stability tests along the way and getting good results, but still trigger a slab, that’s bad luck.
It has taken me some time to respond to this. I have gone back and forth with the idea and understand everyone has their own views on topics. I am not a hiker myself so I really have no insight on what a hiker “should” or “shouldn’t” do BUT as a human being I know for a fact someone should not assume that another human was out to commit suicide. Was Chris fully prepared? Did he tune into the weather? These are questions we can all answer to some degree-even a none experienced hiker…but to assume someone is ending their life as they are out to do something they LOVE is absolutely uncalled for. ESPECIALLY when you don’t know this person or their family who is still grieving and always will be grieving. We are sad, upset, frustrating, and will forever have unanswered questions but what we do know for a fact is this was not a suicide mission. Chris went out doing what he loved, he had goals, this was his high. He has been winter hiking and in his mind he had a plan. I am not a hiker (I will keep saying this) but I have read Tys books and it breaks me into a million pieces to have read those books prior to Chris’s passing because the day I found out he was missing, I knew. I knew what his body would have gone through and I knew he didn’t survive. Do you know his family didn’t get to talk to him? He didn’t call his parents to say goodbye, this was not a suicide mission. He was calling his girlfriend and hiking friends for help…he heard the fucking helicopter that MANY of his loved ones heard fly right above. Chris was still alive and heard his help coming. The things he was saying then, on the phone, NOT suicide conversations. To many he was ill equipped but you were not him. You didn’t have the goals he had. Hiking was his life, pushing his body was his high, and gosh, that many pushed through until the end. He tried to get into the huts and he never stoped walking. He is a father, a brother, a son, and a lover…he worked hard for the life he had and was damn proud of it. Its not an issue for people to pick apart his through process and to say he made unsafe choices but for you to point your finger and state that YOU KNOW this many went out to end his life…thats wrong. YOU are wrong….
What you said makes a lot of sense. Many so called “experts” and “experienced” outdoors people who have all the gadgets and gear get into trouble because they lack the ability to recognize risk and be willing to turn back. Their ego can get in the way of commonsense.
“wood to burn”
So it was 0 and windy, any wood up there is krummholz pine and caked in rime ice. He could have been carrying a jerry can of gasoline and a blowtorch and he wouldn’t have gotten the wood to burn.
Sorry but … while this isn’t the dumbest comment in the history of the internet, it’s not far off.
I think everyone should be really careful of speculating about what happened and what decisions he made. If you were on the rescue team or if you talked to him that night, maybe you’d have legit insight. If not, I’d be weary of thinking that the news reports included all the details.
Plus, it’s difficult to fault someone who dies of exposure for making poor decisions, as it’s a biologically inherent part of that process. I still remember reading, “Not without peril” as as teenager and finding it bizarre that a person dying of cold will take off a bunch of clothing before they die.
Well, the news reports are shit. That’s a big part of the problem these days. We don’t know if he died from exposure. Might have had a heart attack for all we know. It’s not even clear from all the story I read whether he was on the trail or had lost it.
We’ll get the first-hand reports from the SAR teams in the inevitable write-up in the Appalachia “Accidents” section in about six months.
So do you know exactly where they found the body? Was he on the trail, or had he lost the trail? Was he near treeline or far from it? The “news” coverage here is, as is often the case these days, shit. How much did he know about wilderness survival versus hiking? Andrew’s point about the psychology of travel is an important one. How you think about things is as important when you get in the deep shit as before you get in the deep shit. As Dick Griffith, a guy who hiked the entire Arctic coast from Kotzebue, Alaska east to New Foundland and did other trips most people can’t imagine, “it’s never the first mistake that kills you.” It would truly be nice to know what happened here. Did he tell would-be rescuers anything other than that he was cold?
By reports he was in the vicinity of Guyot. Coince
Identally, while getting the 48-4000 this was the first of a few that turned me around. Consequently,The Bonds were my last summits. It took me decades, ages 15 to 66 to complete the 48. Turning around, bivvying low, waiting a day, was and is part and parcel of my hiking guide. I never went up there to put pressure on myself, but rather to experience it to the fullest. The Whites and even Monadnock are “Not without Peril” but they are the most accessible mountains in the USA, but require respect and with my own passing decades, more and more….
As a kayaker, this is always a consideration when setting out. Several years ago, Douglas Tompkins, founder of North Face company, died while paddling across a lake. He had the best equipment, and was accompanied by some of the most experienced outdoorsmen in the world. Sometimes turning back (or not starting in the face of worsening weather) is the best option.
He was closer to the end than he was from the start, at this point- turning around wouldn’t have been the answer. He had 11 miles left and fought dang hard.
there was another option….backtracking a mile-ish to the twinway and heading to the Zealand hut. Would have been tough but that’s like 5-6 miles as opposed to 11.
Matt – I agree with your thinking here to the extent that the Twinway to Zealand Hut was relatively navigable for somebody in a tired/exhausted condition. In the most remote stretches of the winter Pemi wilderness it’s possible the Twinway from Guyot to Zealand was in no better condition than the Bondcliff trail off Guyot. This haunts my thought process. Similarly, I ponder whether attempting to exist back to South Twin and out over North Twin would have been a workable option. But isn’t that the problem? While attempting to Monday-morning speculate on a more sound thought-process, we’re short of important data.
I got caught in an early summer storm in the sierras a few years ago when lightning, 20f weather and snow hit hard and fast, even 60mph winds. I was surprised maybe shocked to see lots of through hikers trying to race across mountain passes with bad weather already there and with almost no gear extra clothes while already wet. I came up in a different environment in the 90s where maybe the goals were different and the competition aspects were rarer. I’ve thought about it a bunch since and Andrew puts his finger on it. Backpackers are doing dangerous stuff out there because they’ve gotten away with it. During the storm people were evacuated off mt Whitney with hypothermia so some did not. People are definitely getting hurt out there. Some who know better, others who don’t. I try to educate people but we really need a culture shift where doing stuff like climbing a pass during lightning storms isn’t the norm. Maybe not related to this incident but definitely to the theme.
Have you tested a bothy bag? A lightweight piece of kit that will shelter you from the elements and combined with oversized body/hand warmers can really save your life.
In US terms it’s a bivy bag. People here have never heard of a bothy, the MBA, or anything else of hill walking in Britain. Mind, the hills are just as deadly. “In
Winter, there’s only mountaineering.”
A Bothy bag is different than a bivy bag, though both would have been helpful.
Great name by the way.
Have you tested a bothy bag? A lightweight piece of kit that will shelter you from the elements and combined with oversized body/hand warmers can really save your life.
Well said Andrew: Stopping or turning around is something that is easier with practice, and also easier if planned ahead:
“If this or that happens, I will stop and hold up”
“If this or that happens, I will exit the terrain”
Check out “Critical Hours” by Sandy Stott for great takes on SAR in the White Mountains and why this area is so quick to take even the most experienced. Conditions that change on a dime, difficult to follow steep trails. I met him once and Roma was an amazing outdoor leader, known for helping folks prepare for weather conditions and take appropriate safety steps to enjoy hiking.
I saw in the report that his mother said “he was not a turn back kind of guy.” I have a lot of experience in those same mountains and the weather can change rapidly. I have actually canceled hikes before, because of the windchill reports being negative 20. I happen to have great gear for those adventures and at some point things can get miserable when the weather is harsh. Most of the fatalities I hear about are people who are venturing out on solo hikes and sometimes having another person with you can help to turn back, because you might be worried more about their safety than even your own. Rest in Peace.
Michael: Or the opposite. The most hellish conditions and situations I ever got into were thanks to friends. My judgment seemed to be better when solo. It’s awfully easy to go along with someone else’s, we can do this….
Based on the Fish and Game report, which cautioned about having proper attire including traction devices and snow shoes, I don’t think he had any of those. My guess, and obviously its only a guess, is that he was trail running with nothing but one of those tiny runner’s packs that holds a few candy bars and maybe a cell phone and water bladder. I’ve seen many wearing the same this winter…but no one was running through deep snow and howling winds.
If you all would like some fabulous reading on adventure psychology, SAR in the white mountains, and why it’s particularly difficult, read “Where You’ll Find Me: Risk, Decisions, and the Last Climb of Kate Matrosova” by Ty Cagne.
Yes, and his other book, The Last Traverse. This one goes into more detail on risk assessment.
Just so you may find it easier, it is Ty Gagne with a G.
Not being nitpicky, just want you to find it. Good book.
I just finished this book, which is an interesting and thorough exploration of a similar death in the White Mountains. https://www.amazon.com/Where-Youll-Find-Decisions-Matrosova/dp/0996218157
This tragedy has happened with an experienced person. Going out in harsh/winter weather alone always carries a risk. Some are barely aware of, and some aware but may not venture out fully prepared. I am of the opinion that being weather prepared and going in company is usually a safer option (as long as together)
I truly appreciate your perspective on ‘turning back’, Andrew. As someone who has completed multiple unsupported FKT’s, 300+ miles, I constantly repeat my mantra in my head “Relentless. Forward. Motion.”. Pain, exhaustion, sleep deprivation, I always tell myself “it will pass if I just keep moving”. I’ve never quit on any of my FKT attempts or thru-hikes in general. I’ve often wondered, what’s my limit? Because I obviously haven’t reached it. That said, with ‘turning back’ in mind, perhaps I don’t want to find that limit. I’m thinking my mantra may evolve to “relentless. forward. motion. But, what are my bail out options?” The story of Christopher’s tragedy has hit me really hard because I also have two daughters, 1 and 5. I keep wanting details, what gear was he carrying? What was his bail out plan? What exactly went wrong? I want to know in order to understand what happened so I, and others can learn from it. Sadly, I know we won’t understand most of the details. One complication of ‘turning back’ in Christopher’s situation was that he really didn’t have an option to turn back. I believe the weather forecast wasn’t calling for a Winter storm that day but unfortunately I can’t find historical weather data by hour. If the weather deteriorated quickly when he was on the AT anywhere past Garfield Ridge (based on the fact that he started at 4am, I’m assuming he was going counter clockwise), it would take a minimum of 10 hours to self-evacuate. It’s remote up there and not many options to get to a trailhead. He had already hiked 22 miles of the 31 mile loop. I won’t speculate, but I wonder if in his head moving forward was his way of turning back because that was his only option.
There was a winter storm warning on that exact day for all of New England, 5-8″ (which usually means a few more in the Whites due to uplsope effects). The Higher Summits were calling for very high winds. The weather was in no way a surprise, unfortunately.
But you’re right, once you’re around Guyot, there is really no bail out plan on a Pemi loop. Where he was is about 10 miles in either direction to a trailhead (Zealand or Lincoln Woods). The fact of the matter is that the weather was certainly already very bad before he made it to Guyot, and he chose to push through with whatever gear he may have had with him.
I agree, that entire area between Guyot and the Bonds is a wind tunnel. The winds come across from Lafayette on Franconia Ridge and are forced through with astounding velocity. It would have taken a down suit like is worn on 8,0000 meter peaks to survive that brutality.
the storm that day wasn’t bad. I looked at the forecast as I was going to hike in the Whites that day too. And I looked at the MWOBS almanac for that day. ON Mt Wash, it was in the high teens/low 20’s with wind <30 mph all day until 9pm ish with light snow. Mt Wash got 5-6 inches in liike 16-18 hours. Not heavy. Not good but not terrible either. The issue was the cold front that came through around 9-10pm (cold+higher winds) as the storm passed by….which commonly happens as a storm exits on top of the fact that it had just dumped a foot+ of snow on the prior Sat/Sunday. NONE of the trails were broken out. I can't even imagine (And don't want to) breaking trail all day for 20 miles.
It would not have been easy, and it may have been damn near impossible bc of the weather/trail conditions but it's 5 miles on the Twinway to the Zealand hut. 2 miles on the Twinway to get out of the worst weather/below treeline (0.5m ish of above treeline, then 1.5m-sh of krumhotlz.
So do that, or cross the 1.1m get below Bondcliff where you're out of the weather.
The weather was just too gnarly, he was obviously tired and he/it was too cold to continue…..you're not going to make it the night out there without some gear.
I was thinking of doing a hike the same day as Chris in the Whites. Decided against it (mostly driving in the snow). While you make some interesting points, here is what I can almost guarantee are the heart of the issues Chris faced.
1. While hiking that day wasn’t ideal due to the snow storm, the storm wasn’t really the issue. I was looking at the MWOBS forecast all day, hour by hour. It was in the 20’s, light wind for Mt Wash (<30 mph), and snowing lightly. Over the course of like 12 hours, they got like 5 inches of snow. Not ideal, but not bad conditions at all.
2. It had snowed a foot+ the Sat+Sunday prior to this Tuesday storm. Meaning, none of the trails were broken out. Flume to Liberty (1.1m ish)=lots of snow to trek through. Same with the really rough decent from Lafayette to Garfield, the whole GRT, and most notably, from South Twin to Mt Bond. It's actually amazing Chris was able to make it through all that trailbreaking. As I'm sure you know, that section after S Twin is all above 4000 ft, gets hammered by the wind. The 2+ miles to the intersection with the Twinway must have taken it's toll….judging how long it took him to get to this point (15+ hrs) and by how great of hiking shape he was in, it really is amazing he made it that far. After you pop out of the krumholtz near the Twinway intersection (before you head down to Zealand), you're totally exposed for like a mile-ish). The drifts must have been deep. Not getting much better all the way to Mt Bond…another mile ish. Which brings me to point #2
2. Looking at the MWOBS weather almanac, around 9pm the cold front went through…as it often does as a storm is exiting. I really believe this is where Chris made an error in judgement, in combination with the trail conditions being really tough. The weather changed, from mid 20's and mild winds to temps around zero and winds gusting up to 70-80mph with sustained winds in the vicinity of 40-60. When he got to Mt Bond, I'm sure he was tired as hell from all the trail breaking (and the ~20 miles). BUt crossing the exposed ridge from Mt Bond to Bondcliff was probably damn near impossible with zero visability, strong winds knocking him of course or down, and the cold.
So again, I almost guarantee 1. he underestimated the trail conditions and how much longer the hike would take him (if they were better, he would have been faster and would have crossed the ridge before the cold front went through) and 2. the forecasted cold front.
Going back aboutr a mile from Mt Bond and then going down (well a quick up, then flat, then down) the Twinway towards Zealand would certainly have been tough. But he was 2-3 miles from being in the clear (a really tough maybe impossible 2-3 miles). Getting over Guyot is completely exposed to the wind/weather, trail was certainly not broken out. Just getting back there from Mt Bond would have been tough too.
Since going over to Bondcliff or out towards Zealand was nearly impossible given his state, his only option was to ride out the storm…at Guyot Shelter area (out of the wind). 0.3 m downhill on surely unbroken trail…I'm not sure what gear he had but for a fast and light mission, I'm guessing he didn't have adequate gear to spend a night out there. BUt with a bit of extra layers, and the Guyot shelter, its possible he could have ridden it out there.
ON the several single day Pemi Loops I've done (sub 9 hour total time this passed summer), all are carefully calculated. The best gear you can bring is preparation and good judgement/decision making skills. Like you, I train hard and am in good shape and I don't think there isn't anything I'm not capable of once I start. But we have to know if starting that day is a good idea to begin with…given all of the variables.
Matt – Your analysis is very close to what my analysis concluded and where my opinion landed. In short, Christopher started an ambitious hike in strong shape, but encountered unbroken trail that slowed him down and put him in the teeth of dire weather change. Is that not classic White Mountain luck? This has happened to me on both skis and on foot…difference being that I thought carefully about exit plans, and then used them. Hard to know whether Christopher thought about turning around. I’d venture that by the time he bogged down on Mt. Bond, backtracking through increasingly dire weather and trail conditions – his single boot-track presumably drifting-in – made a retreat look distinctly unappealing. He was boxed into a corner. From my comfortable warm arm-chair today (Feb 21, 2024) , I wonder whether (given the deep snow conditions) digging a snow-cave could have saved his life?
Again I come back to a book that should be required reading for everybody: “Deep Survival”, Laurence Gonzales. The books central theme is intellectual: re-writing the mental map. Constant appraisal and recognition of conditions, plan readjustments when necessary. When the shit hits the fan, you’re ready, you have a new mental map, you plan accordingly. It sounds simple in hindsight, but I defy anyone to consider any hiking fatality in the White Mountains that could have been survived with a better plan.
I expressed these very thoughts respectfully, but unemotionally) on a popular White Mountains hiking Facebook site. I got drowned-out and shut-down for being “insensitive”: a life had been lost. Tragic, yes. But nobody was willing to discuss and break-down the circumstances that lead to this loss. It’s interesting.
I agree with your assessment. Obviously experienced with the area and those type of conditions and thoughtfully considered all the various scenarios. I think it’s obvious he didn’t have adequate warm weather gear…to one degree or another. A snowcave might have worked…particularly if he had an emergency bivy/a down parka/the ability to start a fire. But I can’t also not think about making the treck down to the Guyot shelter. I know it’s only 3 sided but that would have definitely been a reprieve and up’d the odds of survival…even if he had to break out the 1/3-ish of a mile down hill.
Yea I’ve experienced the same with making these type of logical questions and conclusions on social media. I don’t really care though. Those are the same people who would make the same type of mistakes and who don’t think critically about all the various scenarios and proper planning to not die out there. The tradgedy isn’t in question….the ability to prevent it by actually learning from it is.
I read he had started with two friends. Those two decided it was too risky and turned around, he did not.
The weather was predicted to be lousy that day with snow and terrible driving conditions. It had been predicted for at least a week prior to that day.
There was at least one AMC hut up there that was open to hikers in the winter (Zealand Hut). I am confused as to his thought process especially when he was risking taking a daddy away from a little boy.
This is not true information- he didn’t start with 2 others. Chris also did try to get to the hut..
NHPR reported “He had begun the hike
with two other people, but the others felt it
was too much for them and turned around,
his mother told The Associated Press.”
News is not always correct. He never started with anyone, he went alone. He had planned to hike it with others but they never went. His mother is grieving and there was a lot of pressure to share his story. Not all information was found out until later.
It took a zero points of contact jump on a terrible line down from knapsack col on the CDT before I started asking a lot of these questions.
Solo hiking accidents always seem to draw much more criticism and armchair generals then more common outdoor accidents (solo fly fisherman drowns etc…
He was going for it! As an expert hiker – like an Indy car driver going for the win- amazingly gifted and skilled – pushing the limits is what puts them in their own category. They are not trying to play it safe. It’s beyond what we weekenders can imagine.
When a professional race driver is killed in a raceway accident – no one says he should have played it safe. He chose to take the risk to get to another level.
ROCK ON, CHRIS!
I hope if I die from a preventable situation (assuming he knew about the weather warning) no one praises me for “going for it.” There’s a problem if going for another level is a higher goal than coming out alive.
I get the sentiment but totally misses the many differences between situations. One is in a super controlled environment with cars racing around in a circle with EMS at the ready and little to no risk for those medical professionals who would be called on to respond to an emergency. The other is one in which 1 person, alone, for better or worse, best intentions or not, calls on emergency responders who PUT THEIR LIVES AT RISK executing a rescue operation. You can say “rock on Chris” but they way you get there is not ok.
Your analogy is awful.
Top of Guyot and surrounding area is brutal in bad conditions, even in summer weather. He did have many out options depending on his position, but white out, wind or flash freeze will overcome any hiker no matter how experienced. If he did not utilize his options then he pushed on to his death or as mentioned above going forward may have been the best option. Maybe he stayed put after giving his position, who knows? Anyone winter hiking the Whites on a day solo without over-night/emergency gear has made a poor decision. Poor decisions made after that are inevitable in those conditions especially when hypothermia takes over your thinking. RIP Christopher. Sad.
Andrew,
Thank you for your sober reflections. I know of myself that if I haven’t thought it through ahead of time, when the crunch is on, I might do something stupid. Like touch the person that’s laid out, and might be touching and open electrical source. Whatever help we can have to think these things through before we’re there is excellent.
I like that this article presents a single, and very valid point, and does not try to cover all of the bases, or head off all of the comments that are surely to come. Extreme sports are risky. Sometimes the mountain wins. Let’s just assume that Christopher Roma made all of the right decisions, and the mountain still won. Believing and understanding this assumption will surely guide the rest of us as we prepare for our next attempt on the mountain.
Thanks for the article, Andrew. Well written and poignant. RIP, Christopher.
It is true that experienced backpackers, especially thru-hikers, can (in some ways) be at a disadvantage compared to novices when it comes to safety. Experience, especially in an outdoor adventure activity like backpacking (or any endurance sport), can lead to hubris, and hubris is incredibly deadly when you’re in the wilderness. Mother Nature doesn’t care about your background or how experienced you are; she’ll strike you down all the same if she catches you unprepared and you’re unwilling to accept surrender to fight another day.
Hiking/scrambling in the Wasatch Range in Utah over the last few years (especially on the WURL) has forced me on numerous occasions to swallow my pride and accept there is no shame in turning back. Being disappointed you couldn’t tag a mountain summit that day is far better than never being able to see a mountain again.
So sorry a triple crown thru hiker with so much experience and most likely All of the appropriate winter gear …is dead. .it would be nice to know more details
It is my understanding, he forgot to double check weather before starting. He was prepared for conditions being reported the night before. He was unaware a storm was on its way was the 1st step in the wrong direction. I’m to understand he was still during the rescue and even saw a helicopter. Unfortunately, Many don’t call for help until the situation is already a struggle. Then rescue can take an entire day at times. I try to hike with everything I need to survive 1 night because if something goes wrong, I want options. We all have limits of how much weather is turn back or reschedule time. In winter we MUST take this seriously. Especially if we have goals that cloud judgment and increase our desire to push. I too have forgotten to double check in the morning and payed for it mostly with time and energy. May Roma rest in peace as he has payed dearly.
Knowing when to turn back is a crucial skill in any outdoor activity, but sometimes you can’t turn back, especially in the mountains. Then you need to have the gear and skills to stay put and wait it out. We do know Chris froze to death. I would really like to know what he wore and any emergency gear he carried.
A poker player once told me, “there’s no such thing as a bad fold”. It took me a couple of near disaster experiences to make that my mantra while out in the backcountry.
First off you need to do more research on hiking the Whites! First of all the whites are known for the worse weather that can turn nasty very fast in the USA.
Secondly research who you are writing about before making assumptions. He is very well educated in his field.
Third please look up the number of seasons that the Whites are hiked! For it is a Four season past time here.
Fourth the rescue teams did not turn around until they were out on their way to to the victim, unfortunately he had already passed away. The team decided at that point it would be more dangerous to carry his body out with them through the waist deep snow and high winds. After all it took them 15 hours to reach him. The winds are what forced the helicopter to turn around many times.
It was reported the first call for hell was from friends he called around 10:30pm on Tuesday he also called for help around the same time. Now with that said it took till 2am Wednesday for the teams to reach the trail head and start up to where he was found. They had direct locations. The teams did not reach his location until 5pm Wednesday night. It would only be safer for everyone to have the helicopter return for his body which happened on Thursday.
The whites are infact unpredictable. And my thoughts go out to everyone effected by this sad out come.
Charlene: You’re acting like a “Know-It-All” when clearly, you don’t. You are expressing frustration/anger towards to wrong audience.
1. The author never claimed that The Whites are a cake walk. He seems more than well aware that the NH mountains are dangerous.
2. The author DID indicate that the victim was experienced and had hiked many long distance hikes in his life. What exactly did you want him to “research” to know about the victim better?
3. The author did not imply that people hike The Whites in only 3 seasons. He said that during three of the seasons, Long distance hikers can normally push through and not have to make the decision to turn around (thus, it’s possible some long distance hikers haven’t trained themselves that turning around is an option)
You missed the main points of the article.
4. Why are you acting like you are educating the author as to when the rescuers turned around? The author was correct, many rescuers had to abort their attempt to rescue as they were getting frostbite themselves. Contrary to your belief, the victim was not dead yet. It wasn’t until later on Wednesday, when a couple of rescuers (possibly friends) did reach him that they knew he was dead. In fact Fish and Game had talked to him on Wed AM letting him know that a helicopter was on the way. So he died during the day on Wednesday.
Your condescending way of communicating along with your misunderstandings makes me think you were simply too caught up in the situation and not thinking clearly.
Please try to be more respectful to others.
Keep it civil folks, please. Normally I let comments run, but with this particular topic I’ll be more inclined to shut them down.
I often wonder how much this affects or delays someone’s decision to call for SAR:
“New Hampshire is the only state in the country that regularly charges rescuees for search and rescue operations. While a handful of states, including Hawaii and Maine, have laws that allow them to bill hikers who they claim acted irresponsibly for the cost of their rescue, those rules are rarely, if ever, invoked.
Ironically, these policies are more likely to scare off responsible hikers than irresponsible ones. People who hike into a snowstorm in short sleeves, climb a rock face in tennis shoes, or wander off-trail in an unfamiliar area are rarely knowledgeable enough to be aware of the risk they’re taking, let alone that they could face financial penalties for it. But otherwise-responsible hikers who end up injured or lost because of an understandable mistake may now find themselves having to consider the possibility that when they call for rescue, they may effectively be calling the police on themselves.
State officials have emphasized again and again that they only hold the most negligent hikers responsible for their rescue bills. The problem is there’s no concrete set of standards for what constitutes negligence on the trail, leaving Fish and Game to make their own decisions about who deserves to get hit with a hefty bill.
Take the case of Edward Bacon, a 59-year-old hiker from Michigan who received a $9,100 bill after dislocating his hip and requiring rescue on a five-day solo backpacking trip in 2012. New Hampshire officials argued that Bacon, who had an artificial hip, had no business tackling a long backpacking trip on his own and acted irresponsibly when he chose to jump over a rock ledge. Bacon, who said his doctor had cleared him for hiking, fought the charges all the way to New Hampshire’s Supreme Court, where he lost. Afterward, he said to New Hampshire Public Radio that “the decision to whether you are negligent or not is pretty much up to Fish and Game.”
https://www.backpacker.com/stories/essays/opinion/new-hampshire-search-and-rescue-drivers-license/
Just so you may find it easier, it is Ty Gagne with a G.
Not being nitpicky, just want you to find it. Good book.
Or it makes people think twice before getting into a risky situation. And there is the option to buy a Hike Safety card.
https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2023/08/23/nh-hike-safe-cards-protect-hikers-from-costly-rescues-whos-buying-them/
You Tuber Dixie has posted an excellent video documenting when she had to push the SOS button on a Garmin after she developed a serious health issue while solo hiking in the Sawtooth Wilderness. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WuCMCNFH36I&t=0s
Many interesting lessons: 1) It took hours for the SAR helicopter to get to her, find her, etc….and that was in GOOD weather conditions! 2) Her rescue bill was $60,000 3) Garmin offers SAR insurance (who knew?) which I got the second I found out about it.
She did a second video after the fact that gives more insights into “what happens after you push the button”.
Den,
You are being mislead by that article in Backpacker magazine.
Fish and Game charges almost nobody.
I’m actually surprised victims who survived because of them aren’t lining up to pay them, wouldn’t you if they risked their lives to save you and carried you off a mountain? Even if it was monthly payments, I would be so grateful, I would take in an extra job to say thank you.
Here is a more accurate description if the Edward Bacon story as explained by District Attorney Phillip Bradley:
“When Mr. Bacon set off on a five-day, solo hike in the White Mountains on september 16, 2012, he was 59 years old, had undergone four hip surgeries since 2005, had an artificial left hip that had dislocated five times—including twice during the previous year—had a bad back, was on over twenty medications for a multitude of ailments, and needed to use two canes (not walking poles) for support while hiking. He had hiked in the area when he was younger and, despite his physical infirmities, apparently believed he could still conquer some of new Hampshire’s highest mountains—the respective 5,089-foot and 5,260-foot summits of Mt. Lincoln and Mt. Lafayette— even in the stormy weather that had been forecast days in advance. Unfortunately for everyone involved, Mr. Bacon negligently exceeded his physical abilities under the circumstances. He made it only about halfway before dislocating his hip, necessitating a challenging rescue in horrible weather conditions that required approximately 50 Fish and Game Department personnel and volunteers during afternoon and evening of september 18 and into the early morning hours of september 19, 2013.”
If I were Edward, I would be happy to pay the bill and thrilled that these people saved my life despite my very poor decisions.
As some one who knew him, and knows the circumstances and has insight on who he actually was a person and how he passed. I find this article over simplified and insensitive. I find the comments likewise.
My condolences to you.
So, who made you the expert? Many good, respectful, and insightful comments here.
Jane – If you have good information about Mr. Roma and these circumstances, why don’t you share it. We’re speculating because we lack information, but I presume everybody here wants to make safer and informed decisions in the future.
Thppppt!
I really admire and value what I’ve heard every NH SAR volunteer (who risk their own lives) say, “Most rescues find people fully prepared- they just had a really bad day.”
Stay humble. Be kind.
Not turning back on a thru-hike doesn’t mean not turning back on individual days. Thru-hiking the PCT, my wife and I turned back from a couple of “stream” crossings to wait until the next morning when the flow was lower.
My heartfelt condolences go out to Chris’s family and friends. Hearing of his passing hit me hard. I hike and live close to the mountain range where Chris perished. I did have the opportunity to meet him randomly at a local gear shop when I was preparing for a section of the PCT. He was incredibly warm and caring, and spent a good 45 minutes of his time talking with me and giving me pertinent advice for my hike. May he rest in peace and may his spirit and inspiration to so many live on.
Respectfully, I feel that most who are reacting to his passing on comment forums are trying to understand what happened. While we may never fully know because no one will be able to ask for Chris’ own analysis of what happened, I feel that his story is important to discuss because it cuts deep to the heart of what it means when one decides to enter the wilderness, and why we choose to do so.
Here is a video that takes a look at Chris Roma’s hike if you’re interested:
https://youtu.be/xbocZTusvfQ
It is because I recognized my inherent desire to continue (plus reading a number of books and articles on the topic) that I practiced turning back. The first few times were situations that I probably would never turn back for again. Some of the more recent – one of them just a week before Chris’s death, I double guess myself on – just two miles from Isolation with snow fall increasing to 3” an hour, and less than two hours until full dark. I’m glad I did because I didn’t know that it was going to approach whiteout.
Your observation is spot on. Hikers – even in winter – rarely come upon a situation that is so far from their previous successes that they recognize that this is the time to turn back. And maybe it isn’t. Maybe it turns out alright and it is the next time that they exceed their limit.
But we live in a society that encourages breaking the barriers. If we do not push forward, we won’t ever discover the edges of human capacity. We should mourn the loss of the Chris’s, Kate’s, Emily’s, and (on average) about twenty other adventurers who die annually in the Whites – and all the others worldwide. But, as Andrew says, perhaps (at least in some cases) we shouldn’t try second-guessing them. Some are naive, some have extensive experience, but all are reaching to find out their limits. We should applaud them for that while at the same time continually try to educate those who come after on staying safe.
You never want to try to find your limit when the consequence is death. In the mountains you can’t just quit like you can in a marathon or some other supervised event where help is only seconds away. You always have to have that reserve to get you home. If you push the limits in the outdoors, you will eventually find that limit which can result in your demise. No one should aspire to that level.
My biggest take away from these situations is you better be prepared to survive the night. Many things can go sideways and leave you stuck out there and SAR often cannot get to you until the following day.